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Abstract
The variety of semantical approaches that have been invented for logic programs is quite
broad, drawing on classical and many-valued logic, lattice theory, game theory, and topology.
One source of this richness is the inherent non-monotonicity of its negation, something that does
not have close parallels with the machinery of other programming paradigms. Nonetheless, much
of the work on logic programming semantics seems to exist side by side with similar work done
for imperative and functional programming, with relatively minimal contact between communi-
ties. In this paper we summarize one variety of approaches to the semantics of logic programs:
that based on 0xpoint theory. We do not attempt to cover much beyond this single area, which
is already remarkably fruitful. We hope readers will see parallels with, and the divergences
from the better known 0xpoint treatments developed for other programming methodologies.
c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A logic program consists of formulas of logic, generally written using some special,
restricted syntax. One ‘runs’ a logic program by asking it questions – queries – and
it is determined, by executing a proof engine, whether or not these queries follow
from the program. Queries may contain free variables, in which case the intention is
to determine for what values of the variables the queries follow from the program.
The preceding is a very general description, with much room for maneuver. A partic-
ular choice of syntax can place serious restrictions on programs that can be written or
queries that can be asked. The choice of logic was left open above. Classical 0rst-order
logic is an obvious candidate, but incompleteness results tell us that, while we may be
able to determine a query does follow, we cannot in general tell that it does not, and
∗ Correspondence address. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Lehman College (CUNY),
Bronx, NY 10468, USA.
E-mail address: 0tting@alpha.lehman.cuny.edu (M. Fitting).
URL: comet.lehman.cuny.edu/0tting
0304-3975/02/$ - see front matter c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0304 -3975(00)00330 -3
26 M. Fitting / Theoretical Computer Science 278 (2002) 25–51
this aDects the treatment of negation. Consequently, subsystems of classical logic are of
interest. In the other direction, richer systems that permit numeric constraints or allow
additional operators, such as temporal ones, are also of much interest. And 0nally,
what about a proof engine? Completeness, in the classical sense, may be less important
than eFciency on ‘probable’ queries. Thus a rich variety of systems 0t into the general
paradigm of logic programming. Prolog is the most familiar logic programming system
today, though others have been implemented and experimented with.
The general description of logic programming above makes it clear that it is re-
lated to database query languages. The machinery provided is richer than is customary
in that community, however. One piece of machinery that is commonly available is
negation. In a simple database language, negation is not a problem (except possibly
for eFciency considerations). Either an item is in a database, or it is not, and these
facts can be reported no matter what. But if a system is built on classical 0rst-order
logic, negation can be a serious issue. Prolog without negation can, in a precise sense,
compute exactly the recursively enumerable relations. If negation is added we would
expect to have complements of recursively enumerable relations as well, and we know
this is impossible. Instead a weaker version of negation is used – negation as failure.
One concludes not X if X is not a consequence.
Negation as failure is inherently non-monotonic. If X is not a consequence of a
particular program, so that not X is a conclusion, then if X is added to the program,
the conclusion not X must be withdrawn. Moreover, it is not decidable in general that
something is not a consequence. As a result of these considerations, more than one
version of negation has been investigated. Non-monotonic logic is now seen as a close
relative of logic programming, and developments in either area tend to aDect both.
Since logic programming involves both logic and programming, it should not be
surprising that several varieties of semantics have been developed for it. Some follow
the model-theoretic approach of formal logic, and some are more like the 0xpoint
approach originally developed for imperative and functional programming. There are
also game-theoretic approaches. The overall range of proposed semantics is vast, and
somewhat bewildering.
In this survey paper we will almost entirely con0ne the discussion of logic pro-
gramming semantics to the 0xpoint approach. We will try to emphasize similarities
with semantics developed for other programming paradigms. We do not mean to be
encyclopedic – by now it really would require an encyclopedia. We will con0ne things
to developments that have been of particular interest to the author. Others will have
their own story to tell.
2. Syntax
The simplest of logic programming syntaxes is that of Horn clauses. Prolog essen-
tially uses these, plus negation, which we will consider later on.
An atom, which logicians call an atomic formula, is an expression of the form
R(t1; : : : ; tn), where R is a relation symbol and t1; : : : ; tn are terms that are built up
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from constant symbols and variables, using function symbols. It is also convenient to
allow false and true as atoms. A literal is an atom, or the negation of an atom. These
are also called positive and negative literals. A literal is ground if it is what logicians
call closed, containing no variables.
A Horn clause is a disjunction of literals with at most one of them positive. Sugges-
tive notation for the Horn clause A∨¬B1 ∨ · · · ∨¬Bn is A←B1; : : : ; Bn, and it is what
we use from now on. In this, A is the head of the Horn clause, and B1; : : : ; Bn is the
body. If the head is of the form R(t1; : : : ; tn), the Horn clause is said to be about the
relation symbol R. The Horn clause ←B1; : : : ; Bn is identi0ed with false←B1; : : : ; Bn,
and A← is identi0ed with A← true. A program clause is a Horn clause whose head
is non-empty – it is allowed that the body be empty.
Free variables in a Horn clause are thought of as universally quanti0ed. In par-
ticular, any variables in a clause body that do not occur in the clause head can be
thought of as existentially quanti0ed in the body, because (∀x)[A←B1; : : : ; Bn] and
A← (∃x)[B1; : : : ; Bn] are equivalent if x does not occur in A.
A logic program is a 0nite set of program clauses. Think of its members as joined
conjunctively.
In practice, uni:cation plays an essential role in the logic engine of a logic pro-
gramming system. But as a 0rst approximation in trying to understand logic programs
semantically it is common to suppress this, using the following device.
Denition 1. If P is a logic program, an associated set P∗ is constructed as follows:
0rst, put in P∗ all ground instances of members of P; second, if a clause A← with
empty body occurs in P∗, replace it with A← true; 0nally, if the ground atom A is
not the head of any member of P∗, add A← false.
P∗ will generally be in0nite. It is a convenient 0ction that P∗ will do as a substitute
for P and issues of uni0cation can be ignored. It is a practice we follow throughout
this paper.
3. Classical semantics
The intention is that a logic program, when executed, should answer ‘yes’ to certain
queries – think of a logic program as determining which queries are true. If a query
is not true with respect to a logic program, we will take it as false, though program
execution may not, in fact, be able to tell us that since logic programs can be used to
represent the r.e. relations, which are not closed under complementation. For now, ‘yes’
is positive information and anything else is not. We will take up possible approaches
to ‘no’ later on.
Denition 2. A valuation is a mapping v from the set of ground atoms to the set
of classical truth values { false; true}, meeting the conditions that v(true)= true and
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v( false)= false. We will often refer to a valuation as a two-valued, or classical valu-
ation, to distinguish it from other kinds introduced later on.
Note 1. It is common in the logic programming literature for a valuation to be a set
of ground atoms, rather than a function. The connection is: identify the set S of ground
atoms with the valuation v that is true on exactly the members of S. In this paper we
consistently take valuations to be functions rather than sets.
The standard approach in logic programming is to take false as the default – for
a query to be true a reason for it to be so should be implicit in the program. This
manifests itself in two ways. On the one hand, a ground atom A that is never mentioned
in a program should be assigned the value false, and we have incorporated this by
explicitly adding A← false to P∗. On the other hand, if a ground atom does appear in
a program, and either truth value can consistently be assigned to it, we should prefer
false to true. To ensure this, we minimize with respect to the following ordering.
Denition 3. The space { false; true} is given the truth ordering false¡t true, with
x¡t y not holding in any other case. We use 6t as usual for ¡t or =.
This ordering is extended to valuations pointwise: v16tv2 if and only if v1(A)6t v2(A)
for all ground atoms A.
Of course this gives the space of truth values, and hence the space of valuations,
the structure of a complete lattice.
Note 2. If S1 and S2 are the sets of ground atoms associated with the valuations v1 and
v2, respectively, as described above, then v16t v2 if and only if S1⊆ S2. Set inclusion
is often used in the literature in place of 6t .
The standard model-theoretic semantics is now easy to describe. It comes from [41],
though in fact it goes back to [37, 38] – recommended references are [21, 1, 8, 28].
Think of a program clause A←B1; : : : ; Bn as another way of writing the logic formula
(B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bn)⊃A, and recall, any free variables are to be thought of as universally
quanti0ed.
Denition 4. A model for a logic program P is a classical 0rst-order model in which
each member of P is true. A Herbrand model for P is a model for P whose domain
is the set of closed terms, with an interpretation that makes each term of the language
designate itself in the model.
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Recall the de0nition of P∗, De0nition 1. Any model for P is also a model for
P∗. For Herbrand models, the converse is true as well: a Herbrand model for P∗
is a Herbrand model for P. Herbrand models are particularly simple to work with,
since the domain is 0xed and we only need to specify atomic truth conditions. In
eDect, we can identify Herbrand models for P∗ with valuations, which simpli0es
things considerably. This is what we do from now on – Herbrand models are
valuations.
It can be shown that, among all Herbrand models for a given program there is
a smallest with respect to the 6t ordering of valuations. This supplies the standard
semantics for the program, and it agrees well with the general intuition about logic pro-
grams and with the behavior of (idealized) Prolog. Moreover, several other approaches
to logic program semantics have turned out to be equivalent to this one. It is quite
0rmly established.
Among all Herbrand models, supported models are singled out for special attention.
Essentially, the idea is, if a ground atom is true in such a model it must not be “by
accident,” but rather some clause in the program should justify its truth. Here is one
way of characterizing the notion rigorously, though it does take a detour through logic
with in0nitely long expressions.
Denition 5. Let P be a logic program and let P∗ be as usual. In P∗, replace
each ground clause A ← B1; : : : ; Bn with A← (B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bn). Next, if there are sev-
eral clauses in the resulting set having the same head, A←C1, A←C2; : : : : replace
them with A← (C1 ∨C2 ∨ · · ·). Since there could be in0nitely many members with the
same head we may wind up with a countable disjunction, but the semantic behavior of
such an item is unproblematic. Call the set that results P∗∗. In P∗∗ a ground atom
A turns up as the head of exactly one member.
Herbrand models for P are Herbrand models for P∗ are Herbrand models for P∗∗,
and conversely. Now, in P∗∗, replace each occurrence of ← by ≡, logical equivalence.
A supported model for P is a Herbrand model in which all these equivalences are
true.
It is not hard to show that the smallest Herbrand model for a logic program P is,
in fact, a supported model, and hence the smallest supported model.
4. Apt-van Emden-Kowalski semantics
We turn to the central topic of this paper – 0xed point approaches. We want to
think of a logic program as a kind of ‘revision operator’. If a program contains
a clause Q←P and we believe P to be the case, this clause should force us to
revise our beliefs so that Q is added to them (if it was not already there). The
following single-step operator, from [2], is intended to capture one pass of such a
revision.
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Denition 6. Let P be a logic program. An associated mapping TP, from valuations
to valuations, is de0ned as follows:
TP(v) = w;
where w is the unique valuation determined by the following: for a ground atom A,
(i) w(A)= true if there is a ground clause A ← B1; : : : ; Bn in P∗ with head A such
that v(B1)= true, and : : : ; and v(Bn)= true.
(ii) w(A)= false otherwise.
Less formally, this says the following. TP(v) makes a ground atom A true just in
case A is the head of a ground instance of some clause in P, and v makes the body
of that ground instance true.
What we want is a valuation that the program cannot revise away – a 0xed point
for the single-step operator. And traditional lattice-theoretic arguments supply us such.
The following has a straightforward proof.
Proposition 7. For any program P the associated operator; TP; is monotone; that is;
v16t v2 implies TP(v1)6t TP(v2).
Now the familiar Knaster–Tarski Theorem, [39], says single-step operators have
smallest (and largest) 0xed points. The smallest 0xed point of TP coincides with
the smallest Herbrand model of the previous section, and thus supplies the standard
semantics for P. We will call this the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski semantics [2, 41].
More generally, the valuations v such that TP(v)= v are the supported models for
the program P, while Herbrand models that are not necessarily supported are those v
such that TP(v)6tv, the pre-:xed points of TP.
Example 4.1. Here is a typical example. We will return to it or to variants of it
from time to time. It is intended to recognize the even numbers, and incidentally, the
odd numbers. Numbers are represented as numerals, using the constant symbol 0 and a
successor function symbol s – thus sn(0), where we have n occurrences of s, represents
the integer n:
even(0)←;
even(s(x))← odd(x);
odd(s(x))← even(x):
If P is this program, TP has a unique 0xed point v, and v(even(sn(0)))= true if and
only if n is even. Analogously for the odd numbers.
If we, somewhat arti0cially, add
even(x)← even(x)
to the program above, the resulting single-step operator has the same smallest 0xed
point, but now the largest 0xed point w is diDerent: w(even(sn(0)))= true for all n,
and w(odd(sn(0)))= true for all n except 0.
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One way of proving the Knaster–Tarski Theorem is by approximation to the small-
est and biggest 0xed points. In the logic programming literature certain notation has
become standard here. In presenting this we use false and true for the identically false
and identically true valuations, respectively. Also,  is an arbitrary ordinal, and  is
an arbitrary limit ordinal:
TP↑0= false;
TP↑+1= TP(TP↑);
TP↑=
∨
{TP↑ | ¡ };
TP↓0= true;
TP↓+1= TP(TP↓);
TP↓=
∧
{TP↓ | ¡ }:
One shows the sequence TP↑ converges to the smallest 0xed point of TP, and TP↓
converges to the biggest 0xed point.
It is straightforward to show that TP↑ must reach the smallest 0xed point by =
! – thus the smallest 0xed point can have computational signi0cance. It is also at the
heart of proofs that the least 0xed-point semantics agrees with many other semantical
approaches that have been proposed for logic programs. On the other hand, the sequence
TP↓ can be much more poorly behaved.
Example 4.2. Consider the following program:
p(s(x))← p(x);
q(0)← p(x):
The smallest 0xed-point valuation is, in fact, TP↑0, and maps every ground atom to
false. This is also the biggest 0xed point, but the downward approximation sequence
does not settle on this valuation until stage !+ 1.
Much worse behavior is possible and in general the downward approximation se-
quence may not attain a constant value before Church–Kleene !1. Unfortunately, this
bad behavior of the downward approximation sequence becomes an important problem
once an enrichment of the logic programming machinery is attempted.
5. Negation
Perhaps the most desirable, and most controversial, addition to the basic logic pro-
gramming machinery is negation. We have already remarked that, since logic programs
give us exactly the r.e. relations, a real classical negation cannot be added. Prolog adds
what is called negation as failure – conclude not X if an attempt to establish X fails.
Computationally, this too has its problems, since there may be in0nitely many possible
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derivations of X to be explored. Negation as :nite failure has been proposed as a more
reasonable substitute – loosely, conclude not X if there are a 0nite number of possible
ways to establish X , and all fail. One must understand, Prolog includes a version of
negation that is operationally well-de0ned. The problem is to make semantic sense of
it. And one must accept that when stated in this generality, the problem may not be
solvable. It may be that Prolog’s negation has a simple, intuitive meaning only for cer-
tain programs. At any rate, we will continue with our convenient habit of introducing
simplifying assumptions, in order to get somewhere at all.
As a 0rst approach, consider allowing negative (ground) queries, but do not allow
negation to appear in programs themselves. In eDect, keep the same notion of logic
program that we used above, but require meaningful ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers to queries.
It is here that the downward approximation sequence comes into play. It has been
shown that, for a computationally meaningful notion of 0nite failure, the semantic
counterpart is TP↓! [7, 2]. That is, a no answer should be given to a query Q if
TP↓!(Q)= false. Unfortunately, TP↓! is not generally a 0xed point of TP. Better
behaved, semantically, is the largest 0xed point of TP, which is TP↓ for some ordinal
 that can be strictly bigger than !. This too corresponds to an interesting notion of
negation, but one that is generally not computable – the set of ground atoms falsi0ed in
the biggest 0xed point of TP can be !11 complete [5]. We thus have a choice between
unnatural semantics, or uncomputable semantics. We choose to work with the largest
0xed point of TP, rather than TP↓!, and hope that we can con0ne our attention to
programs for which non-computability issues do not arise.
Allowing negative queries, but keeping unchanged the notion of logic program, does
not go far enough. It is desirable to allow negation to enter into programs themselves.
Denition 8. A general program clause is an expression of the form
A← L1; : : : ; Ln;
where L1; : : : ; Ln are literals and not just atoms, and A is an atom. The body of a
general program clause can be empty. A general logic program is a 0nite set of
general program clauses.
Note that every logic program is also a general logic program. We continue our
practice of working with the family of ground instances of the members of general
logic programs, instead of explicitly invoking uni0cation. The de0nition of P∗ extends
to general logic programs directly, De0nition 1. We recognize that this avoids some
fundamental issues.
If P is a general logic program, the de0nition of the single-step TP operator can be
extended to cover it in a straightforward way – essentially we require that v(not X )
have the truth value ¬v(X ), and then keep the wording of De0nition 6 intact. Un-
fortunately, this does not yield an adequate treatment. For one thing, the existence
of smallest and biggest 0xed points is no longer guaranteed since the presence of
negations destroys monotonicity. What is worse, it is easy to see that for so simple a
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program as P← not P, no 0xed point exists at all. The approach that worked so well
for logic programs without negation clearly needs some modi0cation.
A guide to modi0cation is, in fact, in front of us. For a logic program (without
negations), two 0xed points, not one, play a role – the smallest and the biggest of the
0xed points of the associated single-step operator. This suggests the introduction of a
partial valuation: if the two extreme 0xed points agree on a classical truth value for
the ground atom A, take that to be the value of A, and otherwise the value of A is
unde:ned, or ⊥. (See [6] for the logic background.) Consider the following extremely
simple logic program P: P←P. If v is the smallest 0xed point of TP and V is the
biggest, we have v(P)= false but V (P)= true. Then, in the partial valuation semantics
just proposed, we should take P to have ⊥ as its value, with respect to program P.
Of course, this is diDerent than the value assigned by the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski
semantics, under which P is false. If we are to move towards such a partial semantics,
then, we need compensating advantages to oDset such shifts in what has come to be
standard.
Denition 9. A partial valuation is a mapping v from the set of ground atoms to the
set {⊥; false; true}, meeting the conditions v(false)= false and v(true)= true. We often
refer to partial valuations as three-valued.
This time we want ⊥ to be the default, not false.
Denition 10. The space {⊥; false; true} is given a knowledge ordering ⊥¡k false,
⊥¡k true, with x¡k y not holding in any other case. Then 6k is de0ned as usual:
The ordering is again extended to partial valuations pointwise: v16k v2 if and only
if v1(A)6k v2(A) for all ground atoms A.
This time the truth values do not give us a complete lattice, but we do have a cpo
(in fact, a complete semi-lattice) that is quite familiar. The space of partial valuations
inherits these algebraic features.
Note 3. Once again it is common in the literature to work with sets rather than
mappings. A partial valuation is often represented by a disjoint pair of sets: 〈T; F〉,
T ∩F = ∅. This corresponds to the partial valuation v that maps members of T to true,
members of F to false, and members of neither to ⊥. If this representation is used, one
sets 〈T1; F1〉6k〈T2; F2〉 if T1⊆T2 and F1⊆F2. We 0nd taking valuations as mappings
to be much more convenient, and do so here.
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A new single-step operator is associated with a general logic program P, usually
denoted %P. In De0nition 6 for TP, it was speci0ed when an output valuation assigned
true, and if it did not, false was the default. Now we explicitly specify when both true
and false are assigned, and if neither is, ⊥ is the default.
Denition 11. Let P be a general program. An associated mapping %P, from partial
valuations to partial valuations; is de0ned as follows:
%P(v) = w;
where w is the unique partial valuation determined by the following: for a ground
atom A,
(i) w(A)= true if there is a general ground clause A←B1; : : : ; Bn in P∗ with head A,
such that v(B1)= true, and : : : ; and v(Bn)= true.
(ii) w(A)= false if, for every general ground clause A←B1; : : : ; Bn in P∗ with head
A, v(B1)= false, or : : : ; or v(Bn)= false.
(iii) w(A)=⊥ otherwise.
Here is a suggestive alternate characterization of both TP and %P. Recall De0nition 5
of P∗∗ for logic programs – it extends directly to general logic programs, and we
assume this in what follows. In P∗∗ each ground atom occurs as the head of exactly
one member.
If v is a classical, two-valued valuation, it extends to conjunctions, disjunctions,
and negations in the usual truth-functional way. Likewise, if v is a partial or three-
valued valuation, we can still extend v to disjunctions, conjunctions, and negations, but
we must pick which three-valued logic we will be using. We choose Kleene’s strong
three-valued logic [22]. This is brieRy described as follows. Negation switches false
and true, and leaves ⊥ unchanged. A conjunction is true if all its conjuncts are true;
false if some conjunct is false, and ⊥ otherwise. Disjunction is dual.
Now, here are the alternate characterizations we promised.
Two-valued: TP(v)=w, where w is the unique valuation determined by the follow-
ing: if A←B is in P∗∗, w(A)= v(B) (where we use classical logic to evaluate v(B)).
Three-valued: %P(v)=w, where w is the unique valuation determined by the fol-
lowing: if A←B is in P∗∗, w(A)= v(B) (where we use Kleene’s strong three-valued
logic to evaluate v(B)).
Of course when stated in this alternate form, generalizations are more easily suggested,
as we will see later. What is crucial is that appropriate monotonicity conditions hold,
and for partial valuations and the %P operator, this is the case.
Proposition 12. For a general program P; the operator %P is monotone with respect
to 6k: v16kv2 implies %P(v1)6k%P(v2).
Since we do not have a complete lattice this time, the Knaster–Tarski theorem does
not hold. Nonetheless, the algebraic structure is rich enough to ensure that monotone
maps have smallest 0xed points (though not biggest). The smallest 0xed point of %P
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supplies what is sometimes called the Kripke–Kleene semantics for a general logic pro-
gram P (and occasionally the Fitting semantics), [10], and also see [11, 14]. The use of
the name Kleene is obvious – Kleene’s strong three-valued logic is involved. Kripke’s
name is less obvious, but in fact there are close similarities between this semantics and
a treatment of truth for sentences allowing self reference due to Kripke [23]. Indeed,
the underlying mathematics is identical.
The earlier ‘uparrow’ and ‘downarrow’ notation that was used for the TP operator
is partly carried over to the present setting. Let us use ⊥ for the partial valuation that
is identically ⊥ on all ground atoms:
%P↑0= ⊥;
%P↑+1= %P(%P↑);
%P↑=
∨
{%P↑ | ¡ }:
Here, as before,  is an arbitrary limit ordinal, but now the least upper bound op-
eration is with respect to the 6k ordering rather than the 6t ordering. There is no
corresponding ‘downarrow’ version, since there is no lattice top at which to start. Still,
the sequence %P↑ converges to the least 0xed point of %P, as expected.
If P is a logic program, not a general logic program, i.e., if it does not involve
negation, then both the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski semantics and the Kripke–Kleene
semantics apply, and they are not in general the same. The simple program P←P is a
good example. In the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski semantics for this program, P receives
the value false, but in the Kripke–Kleene semantics, P receives the value ⊥. Which is
the ‘right’ choice? A good case can be made for either. A value of false is reasonable
because it does not follow from the information in the program that P should be true,
so it should be taken to be false by default. On the other hand, the program actually
gives us no usable information about P whatsoever so we could say that, as far as this
program is concerned, P should be ⊥ – no information. It does not seem possible to
choose between these on any ‘intrinsic’ grounds. Intended applications probably should
decide.
Even though the two semantics diDer on programs without negations, they are not
unrelated. As we noted earlier, both the smallest and the biggest 0xed points of TP
play a natural role. In fact, the role of these two is folded into the smallest 0xed point
of %P rather neatly.
Proposition 13. Let P be a logic program (without negations). Also; let vk be the
smallest :xed point of %P (with respect to 6k); and let vt and Vt be the smallest
and the biggest :xed points of TP (with respect to 6t). Then; for a ground atom A;
(i) If vt(A)=Vt(A); then vk(A) has this common value.
(ii) If vt(A) = Vt(A); then vk(A)=⊥.
There are some unfortunate side eDects of this otherwise nice-looking proposition.
Since TP↓ may need Church–Kleene !1 steps to converge to the largest 0xed point of
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TP it follows (with a little argument) that %P↑ may need as many steps to converge
to the smallest 0xed point of %P. Likewise, there are programs for which the least
0xed point of %P is !11 complete. Logic programming is one of the rare programming
paradigms where such non-continuity issues arise naturally. Perhaps rather than devising
more a complex semantics, we should impose syntactic restrictions that tell us, “don’t
write that program”.
Howard Blair takes a somewhat diDerent, and quite interesting, position. In a personal
communication he writes, “that is just the sort of program you want to write when you
want to write something that deliberately exhibits the complexity of nondeterministic
computational processes that emphasize fairness or in0nitely branching nondeterminism.
Both have associated !11 complete decision problems. For example, in the case of
in0nitely branching nondeterminism, there is a strong halting problem (does the process
halt on all computation paths?) which is !11 complete, and this latter decision problem
is the source of the !11 completeness of the Herbrand rule’s failure set.”
On the other hand, when it comes to logic programs with negations, the Kripke–
Kleene semantics wins by default. Since such programs do not give us monotonic TP
operators, the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski approach simply does not apply. As a simple
example, consider the program consisting of P← not P. With only the classical two
truth values available, a single-step operator would never settle on a value for P – we
would have a period two oscillation. But the Kripke–Kleene semantics simply assigns P
the value ⊥, as one would expect. Here is another, more complex example, modifying
Example 4:1.
Example 5.1. Once again, numbers are represented as numerals, using a constant sym-
bol 0 and a successor function symbol s. Let P be the following program:
even(0)←;
even(s(x))← not even(x):
(This program even behaves properly in Prolog.) The least 0xed point of %P assigns
even(t) the value true if t is a numeral naming an even number, and assigns it false if t
names an odd number. The value ⊥ is never assigned – we actually have a two-valued
map here. In fact, for this program, %P↑ reaches its smallest 0xed point in ! steps.
All this good behavior will be of signi0cance later on.
In order to deal with some of the problems of the Kripke–Kleene semantics men-
tioned above, Kunen introduced a modi0cation [24–27]. Suppose we cut oD the ap-
proximation sequence at ! – but this must be done carefully, it does not mean working
with %P↑!. Here is what Kunen showed.
Proposition 14. There is a model M such that; for a ground sentence A; A is true in
M if and only if A is true in %P↑n for some integer n¡!. Moreover; truth in M is
recursively enumerable.
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This provides us with quite a plausible semantics for P, even though it is not quite
a 0xed-point semantics. But it is important to understand what is not being said here.
If P(x) is atomic, it could happen that, for each ground instance P(t), there could be
some integer n such that P(t) is true in %P↑n. But n may depend on t, so for no integer
n would every instance be true in %P↑n, and hence the universal quanti0cation of P(x)
would not be true in any %P↑n either, and thus not in M , although we would expect
it to be true in %P↑!. To bring this about, M must be non-Herbrand – its domain
must consist of more than just closed terms of the language. This gives it a Ravor
that makes it diFcult to use in practice, though it has proved useful for theoretical
investigations.
6. Belnap’s logic
The ordering 6k on Kleene’s three truth values does not give us a complete lattice.
This may or may not be seen as a disadvantage, but it does suggest investigating what
happens when a top is added. Belnap [4] introduced a four-valued logic that extends that
of Kleene, with the explicit intention of providing a logic in which inconsistencies can
be represented without everything becoming a consequence. It turns out that Belnap’s
logic allows inconsistencies to appear in logic programs in a useful way as well. And
it has other consequences of considerable interest, as we discuss below.
Belnap observed that his four truth values have two natural orderings. Both are
shown in the following diagram:
The vertical knowledge ordering 6k extends the one we were using with the three truth
values of Kleene. Belnap’s four truth values can be thought of as sets of ordinary truth
values, so that ⊥= ∅, false= { false}, true= {true}, and = { false; true}. If we do
this, 6k becomes simply ⊆. The horizontal truth ordering 6t is, perhaps, less familiar.
It can be thought of as a more-true-or-less-false ordering. Again taking Belnap’s values
as sets of classical values, ⊥ is less false than false because it does not contain false,
while false (as a set) does. Likewise  is more true than false, because it contains
true while the set false does not. In each case, a move to the right corresponds to
dropping false as a member, or adding true.
Both orderings, 6t and 6k, give us a complete lattice. Let us use ∧ and ∨ for meet
and join with respect to 6t , and ⊗ and ⊕ for meet and join with respect to 6k. The
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notation ∧ and ∨ is deliberately suggestive. When restricted to the two truth values
false and true, they are the usual classical connectives, while when restricted to false,
true, and ⊥ they are the strong Kleene connectives. The ⊗ and ⊕ operations are less
familiar. ⊗ is often read as consensus and ⊕ as gullability. They play a role when
conRicting classical truth values are involved.
There is a natural notion of negation – a left–right inversion. Set ¬false= true,
¬true= false, ¬=, and ¬⊥=⊥. Again, when restricted to the classical or the
Kleene values, we get the corresponding negations of those logics.
Finally, though two orderings have been introduced, they are most decidedly not
independent. We have four binary operations: ∧, ∨, ⊗, and ⊕, and thus 12 possible
distributive laws. All of them hold [19].
Now we can de0ne four-valued valuations in the obvious way, as maps from
ground atoms to the space of Belnap truth values, again requiring v( false)= false
and v(true)= true. Both orderings, 6t and 6k, can be extended to valuations in the
usual pointwise fashion. Also the action of four-valued valuations can be extended to
all ground formulas: set v(X ∧ Y ) to be v(X )∧ v(Y ), and so on. Notice that this even
allows us to have ⊗ and ⊕ in formulas, if desired. Next, a single-step operator can be
de0ned, and it is easiest to base this on the alternate characterizations of TP and %P
given earlier. We continue to use % to denote the operator.
Denition 15. Let P be a general logic program, and let P∗∗ be as in De0nition 5,
extended to allow negated atoms in clause bodies. Now, %P(v)=w where w is the
unique valuation determined by the following: if A←B is in P∗∗, w(A)= v(B) (where
we use Belnap’s logic to evaluate v(B)).
It is simple to check that %P is monotone with respect to the 6k ordering. Now
the usual Knaster–Tarski theorem gives us smallest and biggest 0xed points. In fact,
the smallest 0xed point is the same as the smallest 0xed point we got when using the
Kripke–Kleene semantics. The biggest one is something new of course [12, 13].
There are two orderings available now, not one. If P has no negations, %P will
also be monotone with respect to the 6t ordering and so, by Knaster–Tarski again,
there will be smallest and biggest 0xed points relative to 6t . It is not hard to check
that, for P without negations, the smallest 0xed point of %P with respect to 6t is
classical (that is, the only truth values assigned to any ground atom are false and true,
and in fact, is the same as the smallest 0xed point of TP assigned by the Apt-van
Emden–Kowalski semantics. Similarly for the biggest 0xed point with respect to 6t .
Earlier we noted an important fact connecting the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski and
the Kripke–Kleene semantics: for P without negations, if the smallest and biggest
0xed points of TP agree on a value for a ground atom A, the smallest 0xed point of
the three-valued operator %P also assigns that value; and if the smallest and biggest
0xed points of TP do not agree, A is assigned ⊥ by the smallest 0xed point of %P.
Now, if we move to the four-valued setting this fact becomes dramatically nicer to
state.
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Proposition 16. Let vt and Vt be the smallest and biggest :xed points of the four-
valued operator %P with respect to the 6t ordering; where P is a logic program
without negations. (Recall that these :xed points coincide with the smallest and
biggest :xed points of the operator TP.) Likewise let vk and Vk be the smallest and
biggest :xed points of %P with respect to the 6k ordering. The result mentioned in
the previous paragraph becomes the following simple formula:
vk = vt ⊗ Vt :
But further; we also have the following items:
Vk = vt ⊕ Vt ;
vt = vk ∧ Vk ;
Vt = vk ∨ Vk :
Thus under circumstances where all four 0xed points exist, that is, when negations
are not involved, all four are closely intertwined. Relationships between the two and
the three-valued semantics are really of a general algebraic nature.
Finally, the addition of a fourth truth value does more than simplify the algebra.
We can now create a more general notion of logic program, allowing inconsistencies.
If an inconsistency arises, that is, if  is assigned as a truth value, the program can
still behave well on parts not involving the inconsistency. By explicitly allowing ⊕
and ⊗ in program bodies, as well as the eliminable ∨ and ∧, we give the programmer
considerable freedom to specify what action should be taken in the presence of an
inconsistency [12].
7. Stable model semantics
When logic programs without negation are considered, the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski
semantics takes false as the default, minimal, truth value. Extending semantics to allow
negation shifts this to ⊥ as the default. Is it possible to treat negation, and still take false
as the default? This is a small part of the motivation behind stable model semantics.
Stable models arose in the investigation of non-monotonic logic, and were transferred
from there to logic programming, where they found a natural home [18, 9]. In this
section we sketch the original Gelfond–Lifschitz approach, then in the next we show
how this transfers to the four-valued setting.
Let us return to the setting of general logic programs, made up of general pro-
gram clauses of the form A←L1; : : : ; Ln, where A is atomic and L1; : : : ; Ln are literals.
Conjunction and disjunction do not explicitly appear. Now, the idea is to start with a
general program P, and a candidate for a classical Herbrand model M , and use M to
transform the program into a new one without negations, PM . Since the transformed
program has no negations, it has an Apt-van Emden–Kowalski semantics. If that agrees
with the model M with which we began, then M is a stable model. We have not yet
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given the program transformation details, but even without them the following is clear.
There is no guarantee that stable models exist, or are unique, and the de0nition sug-
gests no way of approximating to them. Still, God is in the details, so let us proceed
with them.
Denition 17. Let v be a classical, two-valued, valuation, let P be a general logic
program, and let P∗ be as usual. The following is the Gelfond–Lifschitz transformation.
Modify P∗ as follows:
(i) If v(A)= true, remove from P∗ any general clause that has not A in its body.
(ii) Next, delete all negative literals from the remaining clause bodies. (If this deletes
the entire body of a clause, replace it with true.)
Call the resulting set of ground clauses Pv.
The idea behind 1 is obvious: if v is our candidate for a model, and it says we
have A, then any clause which requires not A for its application is useless and can
be removed. After this is done, if not B occurs in a clause body, it must be that
v(B)= false, so if v is our candidate for a model, we can take not B for granted, so
we may as well delete it and concentrate on the rest of the clause body.
Denition 18. For a general logic program P, Pv is a set of (ground) positive clauses,
so TPv is monotone, and has a least 0xed point. If that least 0xed point is v, then v is
a stable model.
Example 19. Here is the most typical example of stable model semantics. Let P be
the following program:
A← not B;
B← not A:
Take v to be the valuation such that v(A)= true and v(B)= false. Since v(A)= true,
step 1 of the Gelfond–Lifschitz transformation process causes us to delete the second
clause above. Then step 2 removes not B from the body of the 0rst clause. We are
left with Pv, consisting of the single clause A← true. In the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski
semantics for this, A is true and B is false – we get v again. Thus v is a stable model.
In a similar way, w is also a stable model, where w(A)= false and w(B)= true.
These are the only two stable models, and they are incomparable with respect to
6t – neither is least.
In the example above, the two stable models are both minimal. This always happens:
stable models are minimal. Therefore if there are several stable models, they must be
incomparable.
For a program having no negations, the unique stable model will also be the least
0xed point of its T operator, since the program transformation process changes nothing.
Thus stable model semantics 0lls the requirement of extending the Apt-van Emden–
Kowalski semantics, taking false as the default, and supplying meanings for at least
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some programs with negations. Unfortunately, as we noted earlier, stable models need
not exist (A← not A is an example), and if stable models exist there need be no
favored one, as we saw above. We return to these issues in the next section.
8. Stable models, generalized
Przymusinski generalized the notion of stable model to allow partiality, or three-
valuedness, calling the result stationary model semantics [32–34]. We will continue
to use the term stable here, and when it is necessary to distinguish, we will refer
to two-valued, three-valued, or four-valued stable models. Even though Przymusinski
presents a three-valued semantics, he keeps the idea of false rather than ⊥ as the
default. It solves the problem of programs having no stable model, since one is always
guaranteed to exist. It also solves the problem of some programs having many stable
models, since there is one that is, in a certain sense, minimal. This minimal stable
model was characterized in more than one way – van Gelder et al. [43, 44] gave a
construction that led to its standard name, the well-founded model. Van Gelder gave an
alternating :xpoint construction [42]. And Pryzmusinski gave yet another construction
that established its minimality [33].
The investigation of stable models 0ts well with the four-valued approach presented
earlier. In addition, extracting the algebraic features behind the constructions makes
it clear that they are really quite general. We sketch the four-valued version now, so
for the rest of this section the underlying logic is Belnap’s, as presented in Section 6.
Programs are general logic programs, and we can even allow ⊗ and ⊕ to appear in
program bodies, if desired.
For a general program P the operator %P is monotonic with respect to 6k, but it is
generally not with respect to 6t . This is the source of the diFculties in taking false as
default. The key to the solution is to modify the single-step operator so that the role of
negation can be isolated. We introduce a two-input single-step operator (P(v; w) with
the idea that input v be used to supply values to positive literals in clause bodies, and
input w be used to supply values to negative literals. Apart from this separation of in-
puts, the output of ( is calculated in essentially the same way that the output of % was.
Denition 20. Let v and w be two four-valued valuations, mappings from ground atoms
to Belnap’s four truth values. We de0ne a pseudo-valuation (vw), which is a mapping
from ground literals to Belnap’s space, as follows. For a ground atom A,
(vw)(A) = v(A);
(vw)(not A) = ¬w(A):
The action of a pseudo-valuation is extended to more complicated ground formulas, in-
volving ∧; ∨ (and possibly ⊗ and ⊕) in the expected way, using the various operations
of Belnap’s logic.
Now, here is the de0nition of the two-input single-step operator.
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Denition 21. Let P be a general logic program. (P(v; w)= u where u is the unique
valuation determined by the following: if A← B is in P∗∗; u(A)= (vw)(B).
The following items are straightforward to prove, and are the key to what follows.
Proposition 22. For a general logic program P :
(i) %P(v)=(P(v; v).
(ii) (P(v; w) is monotone in both v and w; with respect to 6k.
(iii) (P(v; w) is monotone in v; with respect to 6t.
(iv) (P(v; w) is anti-monotone in w; with respect to 6t (that is; if w16tw2 then
(P(v; w1)¿t(P(v; w2)).
The rest of this section follows from the items in the Proposition above, without any
further reference to logic programming details. That is, the rest of this section consists
of general facts about operators on Belnap’s logic, and these facts are applicable to
any programming paradigm meeting the monotonicity=anti-monotonicity conditions of
Proposition 22.
Since (P is monotonic in its 0rst input, with respect to 6t , and four-valued valu-
ations are complete lattices with respect to 6t , the following de0nition is meaningful.
Denition 23. Let P be a general logic program. We de0ne a single-input derived
operator, (′P as follows:
(′P(w) = the least 0xed point; with respect to 6t ; of (v)(P(v; w):
Now we can give a simple characterization of stable models – but recall, we are in
a four-valued setting.
Denition 24. A four-valued stable model for general program P is any 0xed point
of the derived operator (′P.
This de0nition relates to earlier work in the following way. Stable models in the
Gelfond-Lifschitz sense are the 0xed points of (′P that are two-valued, i.e., that never
take on ⊥ or  as values. Stationary models in the Przymusinski sense are the 0xed
points of (′P that are three-valued, i.e., that never take on  as a value.
The following are direct lattice-theoretic consequences of the de0nition and Propo-
sition 22.
Proposition 25. Let P be a general logic program.
(i) If (′P(v)= v then %P(v)= v.
(ii) (′P is monotone with respect to 6k.
(iii) (′P is anti-monotone with respect to 6t.
The 0rst item above essentially says that stable models must be (supported) models.
Since four-valuations constitute a complete lattice with respect to 6k, the second item
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above guarantees that stable models exist. In particular, there is a smallest one with
respect to 6k. It is called the well-founded model. The present characterization of it
is not the original one of van Gelder et al., but is due to Przymusinski. In general, the
well-founded model need not be two-valued. The program A ← not B; B ← not A,
discussed earlier, has two two-valued stable models, but in the well-founded model
both A and B evaluate to ⊥.
The third item above led van Gelder to a most interesting characterization of the
well-founded model, using what he called an alternating :xpoint approach. It is rather
easier to present this approach in our algebraic setting. The main tool is the following,
which can be derived from the Knaster–Tarski theorem after observing that if f is
anti–monotone, then f2 is monotone.
Proposition 26. Let f be anti-monotone on a complete lattice. Then f has a unique
pair of extreme oscillation points; a and b. By this we mean the following:
(i) a6b;
(ii) f(a)= b and f(b)= a;
(iii) If f(x)=y and f(y)= x then both x and y are between a and b in the lattice
ordering 6.
This proposition is applicable to a derived operator (′P, which must be anti-monotone
with respect to 6t – such an operator must have extreme oscillation points. Now we
have the following remarkable fact [15].
Proposition 27. Let P be a general logic program; and let vt and Vt be the extreme
oscillation points of (′P; with respect to 6t. Also let vk and Vk be the smallest and
biggest :xed points of (′P; with respect to 6k. (Recall; vk is the well-founded stable
model). Then
vk = vt ⊗ Vt :
So we have a second characterization of the well-founded model as the consensus of
extreme oscillation points. But; we also have the following items:
Vk = vt ⊕ Vt ;
vt = vk ∧ Vk ;
Vt = vk ∨ Vk :
This can be summarized in Fig. 1.
9. Bilattices
Belnap’s four-valued logic is the simplest of a whole family of similar structures
called distributive bilattices, due to Matt Ginsberg [19]. All the results in previous
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Fig. 1. Distribution of stable models.
sections that made use of Belnap’s logic extend to arbitrary distributive bilattices with
essentially no changes in proofs. And the more general structures provide a natural
setting for useful extensions of the logic programming paradigm.
Denition 28. A pre-bilattice is a structure B with two partial orderings, 6t and 6k ;
each making B a lattice with a top and a bottom. B is complete if each partial ordering
makes B a complete lattice.
In a pre-bilattice, think of 6k as a knowledge, or information, ordering, and 6t as
a degree of truth ordering, as in Belnap’s logic. We continue to use ⊗ and ⊕ for meet
and join with respect to 6k, and ∧ and ∨ for meet and join with respect to 6t . We
also continue to use ⊥ and  for bottom and top with respect to 6k, and false and
true for bottom and top with respect to 6t .
Denition 29. A distributive bilattice is a pre-bilattice in which all 12 distributive
laws hold. An in:nitely distributive bilattice is a complete pre-bilattice in which all
in0nitary, as well as 0nitary, distributive laws hold.
Belnap’s four-valued logic is a distributive bilattice (even an in0nitely distributive
one, since it is a 0nite structure). The set of mappings from ground atoms to a distribu-
tive (or in0nitely distributive) bilattice inherits a distributive (or in0nitely distributive)
bilattice structure, when pointwise orderings are imposed. We assume this through-
out.
There is a standard method of constructing bilattices, due to Ginsberg, that is quite
suggestive. Let L1 and L2 be two distributive lattices with bottoms and tops. Think of
L1 as a way of measuring evidence for propositions, and L2 as a way of measuring
evidence against. For instance, in an experimental science, evidence for could be a
probability measure, representing degree of con0rmation, while evidence against could
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be, simply, {false; true}, since one counter-experiment is enough to invalidate a theory.
Now, take as the domain of a bilattice the set L1×L2. Thus each member of the
bilattice simultaneously encodes evidence for and evidence against. Give L1×L2 the
following two orderings:
〈a; b〉6k〈x; y〉 iD a6x and b6y;
〈a; b〉6t〈x; y〉 iD a6x and y6b:
(Here 6 denotes the ordering of L1 or L2, as appropriate.) The 6k ordering consid-
ers an increase as meaning both kinds of evidence have increased. The 6t ordering
considers an increase as meaning the evidence for increased, but the evidence against
went down.
If we take L1 =L2 = {false; true} we get Belnap’s four-valued logic (isomorphically,
of course). If we take L1 =L2 to be sets of experts, ordered by inclusion, we get
a bilattice capable of dealing with information from more than one source. If we
take L1 =L2 = [0; 1], we get a ‘fuzzy’ bilattice – appropriate for the extensions to
logic programming proposed in [36, 40]. Many other examples are available. Ginsberg’s
Representation Theorem says that every distributive bilattice is isomorphic to one
constructed in the way above. And every in0nitely distributive bilattice similarly arises
using this construction, starting with lattices satisfying in0nitary distributive laws.
In the construction above, if L1 =L2 an obvious notion of negation is available:
¬〈a; b〉= 〈b; a〉. That is, we switch around the roles of positive and negative evidence.
The representation theorem extends directly to distributive bilattices with negation.
Central fact: Every result stated earlier for logic programming semantics based on
Belnap’s four-valued logic extends to any in0nitely distributive bilattice with negation,
with no essential changes in the proof.
As a matter of fact this result can be strengthened to what are called interlaced
bilattices, in which distributivity conditions are weakened [3]. Also, for many bilattices,
natural subsystems can be extracted that are analogous to the classical sublogic or the
Kleene three-valued sublogic of Belnap’s four-valued logic. (One uses an operation
called con?ation for this – it plays the role for 6k that negation plays for 6t . We
do not give details here, see [16].) These generalizations of the classical or Kleene
logics continue to have many of the key properties of the logics they generalize, and
are interesting objects of study in themselves.
10. Metric spaces
Consider again the program of Example 5.1, which we repeat here for convenience:
even(0)←;
even(s(x))← not even(x):
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This, call it P, is a well-behaved program that still presents some problematic features.
We cannot use the Apt-van Emden–Kowalski approach on it, since TP is not monotone
with respect to 6t . Either a three-valued or a four-valued approach provides us with
a semantical meaning. It guarantees that %P has a smallest 0xed point with respect to
6k, but this could involve the value ⊥. It guarantees that the sequence %P ↑ converges
to the smallest 0xed point, but this could require as many as Church–Kleene !1 steps.
As a matter of fact, the smallest 0xed point of %P is two valued – it does not involve
⊥. Further, it is the only 0xed point, hence is the unique stable model as well. And
0nally, the sequence %P ↑ converges in ! steps. So the Kripke–Kleene semantics for
this program P happens to have many nice features, but we do not get them from
basic theory; we need extra work. In this case, induction arguments are needed to go
beyond what the general semantical arguments provide.
This example provides some of the motivation for the introduction of techniques
based on metric space methods into the semantics of logic programming. Before giving
a general discussion, let us apply metric methods directly to this example. Suppose we
de0ne a distance function on the space of valuations. Actually, we can de0ne it for
two-valued or three-valued or four-valued valuations – the de0nition reads the same in
any case.
Distance Denition. If v and w are diDerent, set d(v; w)= 1=2n, where n is that integer
such that v(even(sn(0))) = w(even(sn(0))), but v(even(sk(0)))=w(even(sk(0))) for all
k¡n. And set d(v; v)= 0.
It is straightforward to check that this de0nition makes the space of valuations into
a complete metric space (whether we consider two-valued, three-valued, or four-valued
valuations).
Suppose we consider the space of two-valued valuations for the moment. If valuations
v and w agree on even(sk(0)), it is immediate from the single-step operator de0nition
that TP(v) and TP(w) will agree on even(sk+1(0)). It follows that if the distance
between v and w is 1=2n, then the distance between TP(v) and TP(w) is 1=2n+1, and
thus
d(TP(v); TP(w))6 12d(v; w)
and so TP is a contraction.
Now by the Banach Contraction Theorem, TP has a unique 0xed point. The same
thing applies to %P, hence there is only one 0xed point, no matter which semantics is
applied. Thus there is a unique stable model. Further, the Banach Contraction Theorem
also tells us that we approximate to the unique 0xed point in ! steps, independently
of starting point.
A space of valuations generally will have many possible metrics on it. A single-step
operator will not be a contraction with respect to all of them – the right one must be
found. Metrics do not come supplied with a program. In some ways they are like loop
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invariants in imperative programming, and the suggestion with them is the same as
with loop invariants: have a metric in mind when designing a program. That is, have
in mind what a single step of the program simpli0es.
Logic programmers are not used to thinking in terms of metrics, of course. Here is
a notion that is more familiar.
Denition 30. A level mapping is a function from ground atoms to natural numbers.
We use the notation: |A| is the level of ground atom A.
Associated with a level mapping is a metric: set d(v; w) to be 1=2n where valuations
v and w diDer on some ground atom of level n, but agree on all ground atoms of
lower levels. This always gives us a complete metric space. The metric used in the
even number example above is simply given by
|even(sn(0))| = n:
From now on we de0ne metrics using level mappings, rather than doing so directly.
Example 10.1. Consider the following game program. We have some game in mind,
and for it, impossibility of moving constitutes loosing. We assume that each state of
the game is encoded by a term t of the language – if the game is chess, for instance,
a state consists of the positions of all pieces, the game history, and who is to move
next. We also assume there are only a 0nite number of diDerent possible states.
Now, the program begins with a list of clauses
move(a; b)←;
move(c; d)←;
...
enumerating all possible legal moves of the game. And there is one additional clause:
win(x)← move(x; y); not win(y):
If we assume the game has no loops, then the single-step operator for this program
has a unique 0xed point, and this can be veri0ed as follows.
De0ne a level mapping by setting |win(p)| to be the height of the game tree with
root p – the assumption that the game has no loops gives us 0niteness of game trees,
so this is well-de0ned. Arbitrarily set |move(t; u)| to be 1, independently of t and u.
Let d be the metric that corresponds to this level mapping. With respect to this
metric, the single-step operator is a contraction – loosely, an application of the single-
step operator amounts to making one move in the game, and hence shortening the
game tree by one level.
Despite the success of metric methods with these simple programs, various problems
remain.
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Example 10.2. We elaborate the program of Example 5.1 a little:
even(0)←;
even(s(x))← not even(x);
any(x)← any(x):
Clearly, we want the part involving even to behave properly, but the part involving
any should be allowed to have arbitrary behavior. That is, the single-step operator for
this program should have many 0xed points, not just one, but they should all agree
on even and diDer on any. But once multiple 0xed points are involved, the Banach
theorem no longer applies, since it guarantees a unique 0xed point.
Perhaps the simplest generalization of metrics is to pseudo-metrics, which are like
metrics except that the distance between objects can be 0 without the objects necessarily
being identical. Pseudo-metric spaces carry a natural equivalence relation: call objects
equivalent if the distance between them is 0. If a pseudo-metric space is factored using
this equivalence relation, the pseudo-metric induces a true metric on the factor space.
Pseudo-metrics give us the additional machinery we need to handle Example 10.2 –
in eDect we say that valuations can diDer on any and it does not matter. Technically
it is convenient to extend De0nition 30 0rst.
Denition 31. A partial level mapping is a function from a subset of ground atoms
to natural numbers. We use the notation: |A| is the level of ground atom A, if de0ned.
A partial level mapping induces a pseudo-metric as follows. If v and w agree on all
ground atoms A for which |A| is de0ned, set d(v; w)= 0. Otherwise, set d(v; w)= 1=2n,
where v and w diDer on some A for which |A|= n, but agree on all ground atoms having
lower levels. This de0nes a pseudo-metric, and the factor space de0ned earlier will be
complete, so the Banach theorem can be used after all. This lets us treat Example 10.2
quite directly – we omit details.
Pseudo-metrics, or partial level mappings, also let us deal with programs like the
following:
even(0)←;
even(s(x))← not even(x);
triple(0)←;
triple(s(s(x)))← not triple(s(x)); not triple(x);
sextuple(x)← even(x); triple(x):
Using partial level mappings, the even and the triple parts of this can be understood in-
dependently by discounting diDerences on other parts of the program. Then the sextuple
part can be understood by combining results about even and triple. More complicated
examples are possible. In general, pseudo-metrics seem to be quite a useful tool here.
The application of metric techniques is being extended in several directions. Seda,
by using quasi-metric spaces, shows how both the lattice-theoretic and the metric ap-
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proaches can be combined into a single treatment [35]. Khamsi et al. [21] have shown
that more powerful metric 0xed-point theorems also have natural applications here.
11. Conclusion
There are two important topics that are common in articles on semantics but that
have not yet been mentioned: higher types, and non-determinism. As a matter of fact,
both of these have logic programming variants. And both of them are susceptible to
the approaches sketched above, though work in these areas is less well-developed.
Existing approaches to higher type logic programming essentially amount to allow-
ing implications to appear within program bodies, thus permitting a kind of modular
structure [31]. Such embedded implications have behavioral similarities with intuition-
istic implication, and as such have been investigated in [29, 30]. Either an intuitionistic
version of negation, or negation as failure can be added. If negation as failure is added,
a three-valued approach seems most natural [20].
Example 32. Suppose we have a directed graph, and we wish to write a program that
can determine whether there is a path from one node to another. Here is a logic pro-
gram, using embedded implications and negation as failure, for this purpose. Assume
each node has a label, a, b, and so on. The program begins with a list of clauses spec-
ifying the graph structure, edge(a; b)← for each pair of nodes such that a connecting
edge exists. Then, the key item
path(x; y)← edge(x; z);
not visited(z);
(visited(z)⇒ path(z; y)):
The idea is, there is a path from x to y if there is an edge from x to z, where z has
not yet been visited, and there is a path from z to y under the assumption that z has
been visited.
Operationally, to establish that visited(z)⇒path(z; y), the logic engine adds visited(z)
to the program, then asks the query path(z; y) of that enlarged program.
This is a simple example of embedded implications. More complex examples could
have embedded implications within embedded implications, and so on. But rather
nicely, the bilattice approach extends quite naturally to cover such embedded implica-
tions, and the entire machinery of stable models carries over as well. The idea is to
take as valuations maps from atoms and programs to a bilattice. Adding programs as
an argument allows relativization to modules. Details of the bilattice approach can be
found in [17].
The other item we mentioned was disjunctive logic programming. In this, heads of
clauses are allowed to be not just atoms, but disjunctions of atoms. Roughly, such
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a clause says that if the members of its body are the case, one of the items in its
head also is. Semantically, instead of working with valuations, one works with sets of
valuations, and this suggests that a powerdomain approach should be appropriate. This
is, indeed, the case, though the literature so far uses powerdomain theory implicitly,
rather than explicitly. On the other hand, the metric approach of Section 10 carries
over rather neatly, [21], and shows promise of further extension.
We have tried to show that at least some of the kinds of concerns that are important
in developing semantic approaches to imperative and functional programs also arise in
logic programming. But logic programming contributes its own twists that make the
game a little diDerent, and give the results a strange beauty of their own.
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